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Abstract:  We  apply  several  estimators  to  Indonesian  household  data  to  estimate  the 
relationship  between health  insurance  and  the  number of  outpatient visits  to  public and 
private providers. Once endogeneity of insurance is taken into account, there is a 63 percent 
increase in the average number of public visits by the beneficiaries of mandatory insurance 
for  civil  servants.  Individuals‟  decisions  to  make  first  contact  with  private  providers  is 
affected by private insurance membership. However, insurance status does not make any 
difference for the number of future outpatient visits. 
Keywords: health insurance; demand for health care; endogeneity; count data models 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Count data models have been widely used to estimate the predictors of health care demand [1-7]. 
Most  analyses  use  household  surveys  collecting  information  about  health  care  provider  types  and 
number of visits made to different types of providers during the recall period. An important issue to be 
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considered in estimating the effects of health insurance on the demand for health care in these settings 
is therefore to establish whether the demand variable is generated as a discrete and mutually exclusive 
choice (e.g., types of providers visited in the event of an illness) or is in the form of a count or rate 
(e.g., number of visits made to a particular provider). The latter is usually modeled using count data 
models and their variants [8]. 
In  estimating  health  care  demand,  complexities  arise  because  the  underlying  behaviors  driving 
health care utilization may have implications for the choice of the most appropriate model [7]. Further, 
as people demand both health insurance and health care depending on their health status, whether the 
model suffers from bias (due to endogeneity of the choice of insurance status and demand) should be 
scrutinized [9,10]. Deciding on a particular model appropriate for estimating health care demand is a 
difficult process that is often poorly documented in the health economics literature. The purpose of this 
paper is to document the complete process by which we developed guidelines for the selection of an 
appropriate count data model for health insurance and health care demand and to choose a particular 
count data model in estimating the number of outpatient visits. 
In practice we will estimate the relationship between health insurance and the number of outpatient 
visits to public and private health care providers in Indonesia. There are previously published studies 
on health insurance and health care demand [9-11]; Indonesia deserves special attention as it is a 
developing  country  committed  to  universal  coverage  through  a  national  health  insurance  program 
(NHIP). This article provides evidence on whether such a policy would be welfare-enhancing in terms 
of increasing access to formal health care in Indonesia. 
This study also confronts directly the statistical tradeoffs associated with correcting for endogenous 
regressors (i.e., correcting for endogeneity when it is absent results in larger standard errors, loss of 
precision [10], and efficiency [12]). We explore two classes of count data models. The first class is 
characterized by a primary equation with a discrete dependent variable. This class includes standard 
count data models such as restricted Poisson, negative binomial zero-inflated, and hurdle models. The 
second class extends the features of the first class to accommodate endogenous regressors, including 
instrumental variables [12,13] and generalized method of moments [14] techniques.  
 
2. Health Insurance Context and Potential Source of Endogeneity 
 
Table 1 provides summary characteristics of health insurance schemes. The Indonesian government 
has  mandated health insurance for civil  servants  (Askes) since 1968. This  scheme covers  all  civil 
servants, civil servant and armed forces pensioners, and their families and survivors. Civil servants and 
pensioners are automatically enrolled in this scheme. Eligible dependents include spouse and the first 
two  children,  with  the  cut-off  age  for  dependent  children  depending  on  education  status.  The 
contribution is 4 percent of basic salary shared equally by employees and the government as employer. 
The scheme, managed by a state-owned company (PT Askes), covers about 14 million beneficiaries. 
Since Askes is compulsory, people may choose civil service employment based on their health status. 
Therefore,  endogeneity  of  insurance  status  and  health  care  demand  may  arise  for  those  with  less 
favourable health status who choose civil service employment with compulsory health care insurance 
benefits. Similarly, healthier workers may be more likely to choose self-employment or smaller private 
firms to avoid mandatory health insurance premiums. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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In  1992,  the  government  passed  a  Social  Security  Act  (SSA)  mandating  enrolment  of  private 
employees  in  either  privately-provided  insurance  schemes  or  the  government-provided  Jamsostek 
insurance  scheme  (which  includes  provident  funds,  death  benefits,  and  worker‟s  compensation  in 
addition to health benefits). SSA regulations stipulate that private employers with total salary costs of 
more than 1 million Rupiah per month (roughly $100 at current exchange rates) are required to enroll 
their  employees  and  dependents  in  qualified  health  insurance  plans  managed  by  PT  Jamsostek. 
However, the health benefit as required by the SSA is compulsory but optional, that is employers who 
have a better scheme than the one covered by Jamsostek may opt out to this scheme. This policy makes 
this scheme covers only 3 million workers out of about approximately 100 million workers who are 
eligible [15]. Jamsostek covers spouses and up to three dependent children less than 21 years of age 
with benefits include outpatient and inpatient care at both public and public health care providers. 
Premiums,  which  are  capped  at  3percent  of  basic  salary  for  unmarried  and  6percent  for  married 
employees,  are  paid  solely  by  employers  so  Jamsostek  is  non-contributory.  This  policy  may  lead 
employers to choose Jamsostek for their low income employees with health problems while healthier 
employees  with  higher  incomes  will  opt  out.  Thus,  it  is  likely  that  endogeneity  is  an  issue  for 
Jamsostek membership as well. 
Table 1. Characteristics of health insurance schemes in Indonesia. 
Main 
Characteristics 
Health Insurance Schemes 
Askes   Jamsostek   Private  
Regulation  Gov‟t Regulation 69/91  Social Security Act #3/1992  Insurance Act #2/1992 
Insurer  PT Askes (Persero), state-
owned company 
PT Jamsostek (Persero), 
state-owned company 
Private insurance firms 
Membership   Mandatory   Optional-mandatory  Voluntary 
Eligibility   Civil servants, pensioners of 
civil servants and armed 
force 
Private sector employee  Varies, depend on the 
contract 
Beneficiaries  Spouse and 2 oldest children 
(<21 years if unemployed & 
unmarried, or <25 years if a 
student) 
Spouse and 3 oldest children 
<21 years of age 
Varies 
Premium rate  4% payroll deduction 
(regardless of marital status) 
Payroll deduction  
(single 3%; married 6%) 
Varies, depend on the 
risk and the benefits 
Premium policy  Contributory  Non-contributory   Full Contributory 
Benefits, 
providers network  
OP and IP at public 
providers  
OP at both public and 
private providers; IP at 
public providers only 
Usually OP and IP, and 
mostly in the private 
providers networks 
Note: OP = outpatient health care services; IP = Inpatient health care services. 
 
The government also enacted the Insurance Act in 1992 which allows private insurance firms to sell 
health insurance products. These schemes usually offer both public and private health providers in 
their provider networks. The consensus estimate of the number of people with private health insurance 
is 5 million [15]. The health insurance literature has documented selection bias in private insurance Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
 
 
12 
demand; therefore one should suspect endogeneity of insurance status while estimating health care 
demand given private insurance [10].  
Even given public policy and this menu of insurance opportunities, in 2004 only a small fraction of 
the Indonesian population (<15 percent) was covered by any health insurance. Motivated largely by the 
expectation that health insurance improves access to health care, the president signed a National Social 
Security Law in 2004 which will used as a basis for introducing an NHIP in the country.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Model Specifications 
 
This study estimates the relationship between insurance status and the demand for health care. The 
variable capturing demand is the number of outpatient visits during the four weeks prior to a household 
interview. The discreteness  and non-negativity of this variable call for count data modeling [5-8]. 
Furthermore, health insurance status may be codetermined in our non-experimental dataset [10], so we 
utilize models that accommodate possible endogeneity of the insurance choice. 
The number of outpatient visits for an individual (Mi) is posited to be exponential function of health 
insurance (Ii), exogenous variables ( ), and a random error (u1i): 
 
(1)  
where  Mi  represents  the  number  of  visits  made;  Ii  is  an  individual‟s  health  insurance  attributes; 
represents  a  vector  of  health,  socio-economic  and  demographic  characteristics;  and  u1i  captures 
variation  in  an  individual‟s  unobserved  characteristics  as  well  as  random  error.  The  exponential 
function ensures non-negative integers. 
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of Equation (1) yields consistent and efficient estimations 
when regressors   and  are exogenous. If health insurance status is codetermined with demand Mi, 
outpatient visits and insurance status can be modeled with simultaneous equations [9-11]. Continuing 
from expression (1), an individual‟s demand for insurance is modeled as follows: 
 
(2)  
where  represents  an  individual‟s  inclination  to  have  insurance;  z  is  a  row  vector  of  observable 
determinants  that  influence  insurance  status  but  not  number  of  visits  (uncorrelated  with  u1);  is 
defined  as  in  Equation  (1);  and  u2i  is  again  random  error  also  capturing  unobservable  insurance 
determinants. 
 (an indivdual‟s propensity to choose insurance) is not observed; instead we observe 
the categorical insurance status variable  .  
Equation  (1)  is  the  demand  equation,  and  the  reduced  form  Equation  (2)  for  the  suspected 
endogenous variable is the insurance equation. Bias in Equation (1) may arise if important unobserved 
determinants of insurance status   are correlated with the random error (u1) of the demand equation. 
For example, those who are less healthy may have a higher than average propensity to seek insurance 
as well as a higher than average propensity to seek care given illness. It is likely that unobservable 
factors influencing demand are positively correlated with the error term u1 which would mean u1 and u2 
are  correlated.  This  would  imply  correlation  between  insurance  status  I  and  the  error  term  u1.  In Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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maximum likelihood estimation, correlation between I and u1 (E(u1|x) ≠ 0) will result in a biased 
estimate of α in (1), the demand equation [9-11]. 
 
3.2. Econometrics Approaches 
 
The dependent variable takes only non-negative integer values, and thus the family of count data 
models provides appropriate estimation techniques [6,8]. Poisson specifications, in which the mean of 
the data distribution is assumed to equal the variance, are too restrictive: it has been found in most 
health economics applications that the variance of the data exceeds the mean (overdispersion), the data 
contains a large number of zeros (see [4,5,16]), and there is a long right tail. For such data, Poisson 
regressions provide consistent estimates of the coefficients but not of their standard errors.  
A variant of the Poisson is the negative binomial (NB) model [2]. However, with a large proportion 
of zeros, both Poisson and NB predictions exceed typical predictions of such models in the absence of 
zero values. Two common solutions accommodate excess zeros [17]. First is the zero-inflated variant 
of either Poisson (ZIP) or negative binomial (ZINB) distributions. The second variant is called a hurdle 
model, also known as a two-part model. In hurdle specifications, the first part is a binary outcome 
model and the second part is a truncated count data model. This study explores both ZINB and hurdle 
models. For the latter, we use a logit model to estimate the probability that the individual visits an OP 
provider (part one) and a truncated-at-zero NB model to estimate the number of visits (part two).  
Following Deb and Trivedi [4], the first part of the two-part hurdle model is specified as:  
 
(3)  
where  yi  indicates  the  number  of  visits;  the   is  the  conditional  mean  of  the  count,  defined  as 
 and  the  precision  parameter   defined  as   with  k  as  an  arbitrary 
constant; the subscript h indicates parameters associated with the hurdle distribution.  
The second part of the hurdle model is assumed to follow the density for a truncated negative 
binomial [4]: 
 
(4)  
where   is the gamma distribution function. The parameters in the second stage were estimated 
using the sub-sample of observations with positive values of  , denoted as:  
 
(5)  
We use the above count data models to estimate Equation (1) with maximum likelihood techniques. 
In anticipation that we might have misspecified the true (but unknown) population density, we choose 
robust standard error procedures.  
However, maximum likelihood yields consistent estimates only if regressors are exogenous. Here 
we suspect the regressors to be endogenous, so we consider both linear instrumental variables (IV) and 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators for both Equations (1) and (2) simultaneously. IV Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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and GMM allow consistent parameter estimates when unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with 
regressors. One downside of IV is that standard errors are inconsistent in the presence of unknown 
heteroskedasticity, yielding invalid inference. GMM estimators using orthogonality conditions to allow 
for  efficient  estimation  in  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  of  unknown  form  do  not  share  this 
weakness. Windmeijer and Silva [14] provides a useful overview of the theoretical basis of the GMM. 
Mullahy [13] uses non-linear IV (or GMM) in a model of cigarette smoking behaviour. 
 
3.3. Specifications Test 
 
We carry out several tests in order to evaluate the overall specification of the model.  Figure 1 
illustrates  our  operational  framework  by  summarizing  what  we  check  and  what  we  do  when 
assumptions are not met. It shows three main steps for choosing the most appropriate econometric 
technique among the six alternatives explored in this study.  
The  first  step  is  testing  endogeneity  assumptions.  To  test  the  endogeneity  of  insurance  status, 
Hausman specification tests (Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman, or DWH) were carried out for 
each  regression.  In  our  case,  this  test  can  be  interpreted  as  summarizing  the  consequences  of 
employing different estimation methods on the same equation, not as a test for the endogeneity of 
regressors per se. If there is significant difference between coefficients from ML and GMM or IV, the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected, suggesting either IV or GMM is necessary. Given that 
IV-estimated standard errors are inconsistent in the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity, we carry 
out various flavors of Pagan and Hall's test for heteroskedasticity [18] in step 2a. These tests are used 
to  inform  the  choice  between  linear  IV  and  GMM  estimators;  rejecting  the  null  hypothesis  of 
homoskedasticity suggests that GMM is preferable to IV.  
Unfortunately, the consistency of the endogeneity test as well as coefficient estimates of IV and 
GMM depend on the validity of the instruments z in the insurance Equation (2). The z refer to the 
variables  that  have  an  impact,  both  theoretically  and  conceptually,  on  the  suspected  endogenous 
variable  (insurance  status)  but  that  do  not  otherwise  affect  the  demand  for  health  care  ( ). 
Identification of the effect of insurance status on health care demand will be achieved if the z are 
uncorrelated  with  the  structural  error  but  correlated  with  the  endogenous  regressors,  i.e.,  health 
insurance variable. If the instruments are only weakly related to the endogenous variable “the resulting 
parameter estimates will be biased toward standard models even if the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term of the demand equation” [19,20]. 
To evaluate whether potential instruments are weak and whether the instruments are orthogonal to 
the error process, several tests were employed. First, the relevance of the instruments (to suspected 
endogenous variables) was assessed by evaluating the R
2 value and the F-test for the joint significance 
of  the  instruments  in  the  first-stage  regressions.  The  first-stage  regressions  are  reduced-form 
regressions of the endogenous variables on the full set of instruments and other exogenous regressors. 
As our models have two suspected endogenous variables, relying only on R
2 and F statistics may not 
be enough to detect the relevance of the instruments. We therefore used a Shea partial R
2 measure, 
which takes into account correlations among the instruments [21,22]. The smaller the value of the 
partial R
2, the more inconsistent the IV estimates will be whenever the instruments are not perfectly Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
 
 
15 
exogenous.  Even  when  the  instruments  are  exogenous,  a  small  value  of  the  partial  R
2 will  mean 
increased asymptotic standard errors and therefore reduction in the power of the F-test. 
Second, the validity of  the instruments  was  tested by  an over-identification test  [14].  Hansen's  
J-statistic and the Sargan statistic were used for GMM and IV respectively [22]. The former test is 
distributed as χ
2 in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan statistic is distributed as χ
2 
with the degrees of freedom calculated as N*R
2 from a regression of IV residuals on the full set of 
instruments.  The  joint  null  hypothesis  of  both  Hansen  and  Sargan  tests  are  that  the  excluded 
instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error terms), and that they are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. 
Finally, to satisfy an orthogonal requirement of the instruments, i.e., the z should be exogenous, we 
tested a subset of instruments using the C-statistic [22] that allow us to test a subset of the original set 
for exogeneity conditions. In the case of IV, this C-statistic was computed as the difference between 
two  Sargan  statistics,  whilst  for  efficient  GMM,  it  was  computed  as  the  difference  between  two  
J-statistics). The C-test, distributed χ
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the loss of overidentifying 
restrictions, has the null hypothesis that the specified variables are proper instruments. 
Figure  1.  Framework  to  select  econometric  techniques  for  modeling  the  relationships 
between health insurance and the number of outpatient visits. 
 
 
When null hypotheses of exogenous regressors were not rejected, we used count data models that 
ignore  endogeneity.  A  number  of  approaches  were  employed  to  select  a  specification  that  could 
appropriately accommodate overdispersion and excess zeros. First, to discriminate between Poisson 
and NB, we used a regression based approach [2] to calculate a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic as well as 
two traditional selection criteria based on the penalized log-likelihood, the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC)  and Bayesian  Information  Criteria (BIC). Second, we tested the excess-zero assumption. A Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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Vuong test was used to discriminate between the standard NB and ZINB models. The Vuong test has a 
standard normal distribution with large positive values favoring the ZINB model and large negative 
values favoring the NB model [23]. To discriminate between the HNB model and restricted NB model, 
following  Gerdtham  [24]  we  applied  the  likelihood  ratio  (LR)  test  defined  as:  λ  =  2(lnLlogit  +  
lnLtruncNB − lnLNB). Both AIC and BIC measures were again utilized; models yielding the smallest 
values of the AIC and BIC are preferred [7,16]. 
 
4. Data and Variables 
 
The data for this study come from the second round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS2) 
carried  out  by  the  RAND  Corporation.  The  first  round  of  survey  (IFLS1)  included  interviews  
with 22,347 individuals from 7,224 households. The IFLS2 re-contacted the same households and 
succeeded in re-interviewing 93.5percent of IFLS1 households (6751 households with over 33,000 
individuals). An overview of the survey is described in [25] for IFLS1 and [26] for IFLS2.  
This study considers two mutually exclusive measures of OP visits: public and private providers. 
Not all insurance schemes offer health care services from both public and private providers and sample 
distributions of these variables (presented in Table 2) show that approximately 85 percent of IFLS 
individuals had zero visits to public OP and about 92 percent had zero private OP visits. The sample 
means for the number of visits to public and private OP were 0.28 and 0.15 respectively while the 
sample variances were 0.67 and 0.43 respectively. The ratio between the sample variance and the 
sample mean for the number to public and private OP visits were 2.39 and 2.87, respectively. These 
averages indicate the observed data is over-dispersed. 
Table 2.  Sample frequency distribution of the number of public and private outpatient 
visits (number of observations = 13639). 
Number of visits 
Public outpatient visits    Private outpatient visits 
Freq.  Percent    Freq.  Percent 
0  11,589  84.97    12,573  92.18 
1  1,061  7.78    562  4.12 
2  544  3.99    269  1.97 
3  246  1.80    118  0.87 
4  150  1.10    81  0.59 
5  15  0.11    5  0.04 
6  17  0.12    6  0.04 
7  7  0.05    7  0.05 
8  -      8  0.06 
9  -      -   
10  10  0.07    10  0.07 
y(mean)  0.28    0.15 
s
2y(variance)  0.67    0.43 
S
2y/y  2.39    2.87 
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Two insurance variables, Askes and Private, enter demand Equation (1) as dummy variables. Askes 
represents mandatory insurance for civil servants and entitles beneficiaries to comprehensive health 
care from public providers only. Private represents both Jamsostek (insurance for private employees) 
and private insurance schemes and therefore may be entitling beneficiaries to care from both public 
and private providers. Since the effects of health insurance on health care demand might differ across 
income groups, an interaction term for insurance and income was included in the demand model. This 
interaction allows one to test whether income has different effects of insurance on the number of 
outpatient visits. 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the variables used in the demand equation. 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Askes insurance   1 if govt-employ insurance; 0 otherwise  0.098  0.298 
Private insurance   1 if priv-employ insurance; 0 otherwise  0.052  0.223 
Askes*income   Interaction Askes and income  0.165  0.775 
Private*income   Interaction Jamsostek and income  0.073  0.419 
Symptoms   1 if had ≥ 1 symptom; 0 otherwise  0.963  0.189 
Score ADLs   Physical ability to perform daily activity   0.295  0.456 
Very good GHS 
R  Very good health status     
GHS is good   General health status was good  0.788  0.409 
GHS is poor  General health was bad & very bad  0.135  0.342 
Serious illness  1 if had serious ill; 0 otherwise  0.127  0.333 
Female  1 if female; 0 otherwise  0.574  0.495 
Household size  Number of household members  5.878  2.594 
Married  1 if married; 0 otherwise  0.842  0.365 
No-schooling
R  Had no education     
Elementary   Had some primary education  0.475  0.499 
Junior   Had some secondary education  0.136  0.343 
Senior   Had some senior education  0.196  0.397 
High   Had some higher education  0.069  0.254 
Age (years)  Individual age in years  36.988  11.654 
Ln. Income   Log natural per-capita income (Rp)  11.099  0.855 
Electricity  1 if had electricity; 0 otherwise  0.870  0.336 
TravCost public   Log one way travel-costs to public health post   6.688  5.868 
TravCost private   Log one way travel-costs to private health post   3.278  4.792 
TravTime public   Log one way travel-time to public post  8.053  1.769 
TravTime private   Log one way travel-time to private post  6.975  2.353 
Urban   1 if urban; 0 otherwise  0.488  0.500 
Jakarta Region
R  Jakarta residence     
Sumatra   Lived in Sumatra  0.195  0.396 
West Java   Lived in West Java  0.178  0.383 
Central Java  Lived in Central Java  0.188  0.391 
East Java  Lived in East Java  0.121  0.326 
Bali & WNT  Lived in Bali and WNT  0.112  0.316 
Kalimantan  Lived in Kalimantan  0.049  0.216 
Sulawesi  Lived in Sulawesi  0.056  0.229 
R is the reference group. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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In  demand  Equation  (1),  the  health-status  vector  consisted  of  dummy  variables  indicating  the 
presence of symptoms, self-assessed general health (GHS) and severity of illness. A score assessing 
physical ability in the performance of daily activities (ADLs) was also included (with higher scores 
indicating worse ability). The vector of demographic variables consisted of age (years), gender (1/0), 
marital  status  (1/0),  dummies  for  education,  income  (log  natural),  electricity  usage  (1/0),  and  the 
natural  log  of  one-way  travel  time  and  travel  cost  to  health  facilities.  To  control  for  regional 
differences we used dummy variables for urban and seven regions (rural and Jakarta serving as the 
reference groups). Summary statistics for the variables used in the demand Equation (1) are presented 
in Table 3. 
The  endogeneity  test  as  well  as  IV  and  GMM  estimators  can  only  be  applied  if  one  finds 
appropriate  instruments.  We  propose  candidate  instrumental  variables  z  that  may  satisfy  two 
requirements  [14]:  they  should  be  correlated  with  the  endogenous  variable(s)  and  they  should  be 
orthogonal to the error process. The proposed z are presented in Appendix A.  
We estimated reduced form regressions of the endogenous variables on the full set of instruments 
(Equation  (2))  using  a  probit  model.  The  main  objective  was  to  generate  the  predicted  values  of 
insurance to be included as an additional instrument in IV and GMM techniques. The basic conclusion 
was that the insurance decision was more determined by income, education, age and location variables. 
All the proposed instruments in Appendix A except household head‟s employment type had a positive 
correlation with choice of Askes insurance (p-value < 0.01). For Private insurance, only four of the 
proposed instruments (household head‟s employment type, spouse, if active in community meetings 
and if housing occupied) had significant positive correlations. R
2 reveals that the covariates in the 
Askes insurance estimates explained 30 percent of the overall variation, but only 20 percent of Private 
insurance variation. The joint Wald statistics shows all covariates were jointly significant in either 
insurance equation at the one percent level. After trying different specifications, we have selected from 
the proposed z two different subsets as final instruments for the Askes and Private equations (see 
Appendix A). These subsets of z were included in the estimation of insurance model (Equation (2)) but 
excluded from the demand model (Equation (1)). 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Model Selections 
 
5.1.1. Public outpatient visits 
 
For public OP visits, the endogeneity test was rejected at 1 percent level (Table 4), suggesting that 
the ML estimators of standard count data model would result in inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Therefore, a further consideration was to select either IV or GMM estimator. The Pagan and Hall's test 
in  GMM-estimates  (χ
2(40)  =  1140.59)  and  in  IV-estimate  (χ
2(40)  =  1147.01)  rejected  the  null 
hypothesis  of  homoskedasticity  at  1  percent  level.  This  result  suggests  that  GMM  estimator  is 
preferable to model the number of public OP visits. 
An appropriate set of instruments are prerequisites to employ the endogeneity test as well as to 
estimate a model using IV and GMM estimators. A number of tests were therefore employed to test the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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relevancy,  validity  and  orthogonality  requirements  of  the  instruments.  Table  5  provides  summary 
statistics used in testing the relevance of the instruments. The R
2 shows that the models explained a 
high proportion of the variation for Askes and Private insurance in both public and private OP visits. 
Note however that if an estimated equation yields a large value of the Partial R
2 and a small value of 
the Shea measure, one may conclude that the instruments lack sufficient relevance to explain all the 
endogenous regressors and the model may be essentially unidentified [19]. In our case, the values of 
Partial R
2 and Shea partial R
2 were similar for both Askes and Private insurance, indicating that our 
model is well identified. 
Table 4. Endogeneity tests. 
Endogeneity test: 
Public outpatient visits    Private outpatient visits 
Statistics  p-val.    Statistics  p-val. 
Hausman   F(2,13607) = 10.283   0.00003    F(2) = 0.537  0.585 
Durbin Wu Hausman   χ
2(2) = 20.584   0.00003    χ
2(2) = 1.076  0.584 
 
The relevance of the instruments was also investigated using the F-test to determine whether the 
instruments were correlated with the potentially endogenous variable [19]. The null hypothesis of the 
F-test that the parameters of the covariates are jointly equal to zero was rejected in both insurance 
types, indicating that all the instruments were jointly significant in the insurance choice equation. A 
conservative  rule  of  thumb  for  a  single  endogenous  regressor  would  suggest  that  a  less  than  10  
F-value could be an indicator of a weak instrument [19].  
The validity of the instruments was performed by applying a standard test for the over-identifying 
restrictions. We could not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification in public outpatient visits. 
The  value  of  the  Hansen's  J-statistic  (GMM-estimates)  and  Sargan's  statistic  (IV-estimates)  tests  
was 1.921 (p-value = 0.383) and 1.846 (p-value = 0.397), respectively. This suggested that the models 
are reasonably well specified and the instruments are valid. 
Table 5. Tests for the relevance of instruments.  
Test statistic  
Public outpatient visits 
Askes insurance  Private insurance 
Pseudo R
2     
Unadjusted R
2  0.4973  0.5697 
Adjusted R
2  0.4962  0.5688 
Partial R
2  0.0561  0.0213 
Shea Partial R
2  0.0518  0.0197 
F-tests:     
Wald test 
(a)  434.24
‡  581.22
‡ 
Wald test 
(b)  202.26
‡  74.17
‡ 
(a)F-test all instruments F(31,13607); 
(b)F-test excluded instruments F(4,13607); 
‡significant 1%. 
 
The orthogonality condition of the instruments was assessed using the C-statistic. The value of the 
test was 0.224 with p-value = 0.636, suggesting that the instruments used are exogenous. All empirical Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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evidence described above led us to conclude that the selected instruments were appropriate enough to 
run the demand models. 
 
5.1.2. Private outpatient visits 
 
For private OP visits, we could not reject the exogeneity hypothesis (p-value = 0.585). Therefore, 
we considered the ML estimators for standard count data models. Table 6 presents model selection 
criteria applied to choose the most appropriate econometric technique. We first used the results of 
over-dispersion measures (LR, AIC and BIC) to discriminate between the Poisson and NB models. 
The estimated over-dispersion parameter calculated from the NB was positive,   = 7.07, indicating 
the presence of over-dispersion. This is also corroborated by the results of the LR test −311.28 [2 
(1203.21 − 1047.57)]. As this was significant at 1 percent level, the Poisson was rejected in favor of 
the NB. Both AIC and BIC values also favored the NB. However, the NB ignores the existence of 
excess zeroes (non-users), which in private OP visits account for 92 percent (Table 2), and also treats 
users and non-users identically. This motivated us to consider further specifications in the regime of 
models that take into account excess-zeros. Possible alternatives were either ZINB or HNB. 
In order to select whether NB or ZINB could be used, the Vuong test was employed. The result 
shows that the test  was highly significant  in  favor  of the  ZINB. However,  there  were  very large 
standard errors of the coefficients in the „inflation‟ equation. This implied a definite lack of fit in case 
of the ZINB (results from the inflated equation are not presented here but are available from the  
first author).  
Table 6. Selection criteria of the standard count data models: private outpatient visits. 
  
  
Poisson  NB  ZINB 
Hurdle Negative Binomial (HNB) 
1
st part:  
Logit 
2
nd part: 
Truncated NB 
Observation (n)  13,639  13,639  13,639  13,639  1,066 
LR test (29)
a  1,203.21
‡  1,047.57
‡  779.22
‡  866.94
‡  145.54
‡ 
-Log-L  5,829.72  4,735.27  4,712.28  3,271.52  1,346.48 
Overdispersion test
b  12.48
‡  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
Vuong test 
c  n.a  n.a  3.3
‡  n.a  n.a 
Alpha
d  n.a  7.07  4.17  n.a  0.53 
AIC  11,719.45  9,532.55  9,504.56  6,603.05  2,752.95 
BIC  1,970.47  588.42  533.08  661.79   
LR vs. Poisson test
e  n.a   n.a  n.a  n.a  8,966.49
‡ 
aLog  ratio  test  of  the  joint  significance  of  the  regressors  (in  ZINB,  number  of  regressors  are  38); 
bOverdispersion test for Poisson vs. NB model; 
cVuong test for standard NB vs. zero-inflated NB model; 
dAn 
ancillary parameter alpha (α) is an estimate of the degree of overdispersion in the data; 
eLog ratio test for 
truncated NB vs. truncated Poisson; n.a = not available, and 
‡significant at 1%. 
 
Another  option  to  model  excess-zeros  is  to  apply  HNB.  We  based  the  comparison  of  this 
specification on the LR test and AIC values. The resulting LR test statistic χ
2(29) for the NB model 
against the HNB model was 70.18 {2[1,047.57 − (866.94 + 145.54)]}, and was significant at 1 
percent level, indicating that the HNB model could be justified well. This was also supported by the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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AIC,  i.e.,  this  model  had  the  smallest  value  of  AIC  among  the  four  standard  count  data  models. 
Finally, we tested the truncated Poisson model against the truncated NB model. The resulting LR 
statistic χ
2(1) was 8966.5 and was significant at 1 percent level, indicating that the truncated Poisson 
model must be rejected against the truncated NB model. The LR test does not appear in Figure 1 since 
we did not explore the truncated Poisson model. The test provides an additional justification on the  
use of HNB.  
5.2. Model Estimation Results 
Putting together all of the above evidence, we concluded that the HNB specification is preferable to 
estimate  the  number  of  private  OP  visits.  We  describe  below  the  results  obtained  from  GMM 
estimation for public OP visits and HNB for private OP visits.  
5.2.1. Number of public outpatient visits 
The first column of Table 7 presents the results from GMM estimation of the number of public OP 
visits.  Given  that  the  equation  for  the  number  of  visits  is  non-linear,  there  is  a  slightly  different 
interpretation for dummy- and continuous-variable coefficients. For coefficients on the Askes dummy 
variable, as  , then  . For   small enough, it can be 
interpreted  as  the  proportionate  increase  in  the  mean  of  the  visits  owing  to  the  Askes  insurance  
effect [2]. Since   is 0.63, then on average individuals with Askes coverage would have approximately 
63 percent more visits to public outpatient care. For continuous variables such as age, ADL scores, and 
family size, the relation that holds is [27]:  , so the elasticity of Mi with respect to xik is 
linear in coefficient βk. 
Coefficients on insurance dummies (Askes and Private) are positive for both schemes but significant 
only for Askes (one percent level). The coefficients on interaction terms between insurance status and 
income are not significantly different from zero, suggesting such interactions are not important for 
predicting health care demand. All health status measures have important effects on public OP demand 
and  the  effects  are  statistically  significant  (p-value  <  0.01).  Individuals  who  were  suffering  from 
symptoms, had higher ADL scores, and were seriously ill are more likely to have public OP visits. 
Relative to very good health, individuals with self-rated good and poor health are likely to have more 
visits. The effect of poor health is larger than the corresponding effect of good health (36 percent  
vs. 5 percent). 
Women are 11 percent more likely to have more visits to public OP than men. Being married 
increased the average number of visits by five percent. With the exception of elementary school, the 
estimated effect of education is significantly negative. This indicates that higher levels of education 
lead to a reduction in the number of visits to public OP care (holding health status and all other 
covariates constant). Income elasticity for public visits was 0.03 (p-value < 0.01). Having electricity in 
the  household  leads  to  increases  in  public  OP  visits  by  about  11  percent  (p-value  <  0.01).  The 
coefficients on log travel cost and time were positive but significant only in the case of the latter  
(p-value < 0.05). Urban dwellers are likely to have 11 percent fewer visits to public OP than rural Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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residents. Jakarta‟s inhabitants were likely to have a significantly lower average number of public OP 
visits than individuals who live in Bali, West Nusa Tenggara or Kalimantan.  
Table 7. Estimation results of the GMM and HNB models. 
Variable 
[1]    [2] 
Public outpatient 
visits: GMM 
  Private outpatient visits: HNB 
  1
st part: Logit    2
nd part: NB 
Coef.
a  (se)
 b    Coef.
a  (se) 
b    Coef.
a  (se)
b 
Askes insurance  0.631
‡  (0.154)    −0.017  (0.135)    −0.298  (0.219) 
Private insurance  0.197  (0.281)    1.274
‡  (0.184)    0.272  (0.210) 
Askes*income   0.003  (0.040)    −0.023  (0.044)    0.033  (0.064) 
Private*income   −0.145  (0.114)    −0.319
‡  (0.107)    0.075  (0.153) 
Symptoms  0.287
‡  (0.024)    3.174
‡  (0.717)    16.314  (0.000) 
Score ADLs   0.098
‡  (0.021)    0.345
‡  (0.079)    0.077  (0.100) 
GHS very good
R                 
GHS is good  0.050
†  (0.021)    0.414
‡  (0.149)    0.471
‡  (0.174) 
GHS is poor  0.355
‡  (0.032)    1.390
‡  (0.164)    0.738
‡  (0.216) 
Serious illness   0.086
‡  (0.024)    0.721
‡  (0.083)    0.493
‡  (0.170) 
Female  0.118
‡  (0.015)    0.147
†  (0.074)    0.289
‡  (0.086) 
Household size   0.006
†  (0.003)    0.046
‡  (0.013)    0.029  (0.020) 
Married  0.055
†  (0.022)    −0.286
‡  (0.102)    −0.117  (0.155) 
No−schooling
R                 
Elementary   −0.019  (0.024)    0.362
†  (0.142)    0.357
†  (0.160) 
Junior   −0.091
‡  (0.033)    0.455
‡  (0.169)    0.117  (0.186) 
Senior   −0.083
*  (0.046)    0.505
‡  (0.164)    −0.246  (0.193) 
High   −0.262
‡  (0.056)    0.756
‡  (0.185)    0.175  (0.234) 
Age (years)   −0.001  (0.001)    0.003  (0.004)    −0.001  (0.004) 
Ln income  0.031
‡  (0.012)    0.383
‡  (0.051)    −0.034  (0.062) 
Electricity  0.106
‡  (0.022)    1.003
‡  (0.198)    0.107  (0.263) 
TravCost (ln)  0.002  (0.001)    0.015
†  (0.007)    −0.004  (0.007) 
TravTime (ln)  0.009
†  (0.004)    0.029
*  (0.018)    0.065
†  (0.026) 
Urban  −0.109
‡  (0.021)    0.228
‡  (0.083)    0.276
†  (0.112) 
Jakarta Region
R                 
Sumatra   0.027  (0.034)    −0.327
†  (0.127)    0.077  (0.204) 
West Java   −0.047  (0.034)    −0.112  (0.116)    0.302
†  (0.132) 
Central Java  −0.034  (0.032)    0.089  (0.122)    0.141  (0.152) 
East Java  0.052  (0.037)    0.509
‡  (0.135)    0.554
‡  (0.157) 
Bali & WNT  0.076
†  (0.036)    0.150  (0.143)    0.015  (0.170) 
Kalimantan  0.136
†  (0.054)    −1.080
‡  (0.257)    0.360  (0.425) 
Sulawesi  0.042  (0.042)    −0.648
‡  (0.242)    0.092  (0.289) 
Constant  −0.730
‡  (0.129)    −12.743
‡  (1.002)    −17.923
‡  (1.097) 
Number observations  13639      13639      1066   
aThe estimated parameters; superscript 
‡,
† †, and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; 
bRobust standard errors in (parentheses); 
R is the reference group. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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5.2.2. Number of private outpatient visits 
 
The  results  from  HNB  estimation  of  private  OP  visits  are  presented  in  the  second  column  of  
Table  7.  The  first-part  estimate  (binary  logit)  represents  contact  decisions  while  the  second-part 
estimate (truncated-NB) represents the frequency decision. The estimated effect of the dummy for 
Askes is negative in both decision stages while for Private the coefficient is positive in both decision 
stages  but  only  significant  in  the  contact  decision  (p-value  <  0.01).  Negative  coefficients  on  the 
interaction term between private insurance and income in first-part estimates imply that the probability 
of private OP visits, with other covariates held constant, is greater among low income groups. 
With regard to health status, gender, household size, income, electricity, travel cost and time, and 
age,  coefficients  are  similar  to  those  in  the  public  OP  demand  regressions  described  above.  For 
example, the estimated effects of all health status measures were significantly positive in the first-part 
(contact decision) suggesting that individuals with a lower health status have a higher probability of 
visiting private OP providers. 
The estimated effects of the four education dummies (elementary, junior, senior and high) were all 
positive and significant at 1 percent level in the contact decision. Living in an urban area increased the 
probability to visit a private OP by 25 percent and the frequency of private OP visits by 28 percent. 
East Java residents were more likely to contact private OP (36 percent) and make more subsequent 
visits (55 percent) compared to Jakarta inhabitants. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This study has estimated the relationship between health insurance and the number of public and 
private outpatient visits in Indonesia. We have explored two econometric classes of count data models: 
a  specification  that  ignores  endogeneity  of  insurance  choice  and  a  specification  that  considers 
endogeneity  of  insurance  choice.  Although  both  IV  and  GMM  estimators  allow  for  controlling 
endogeneity of the insurance in the estimation [13,14], they are generally less efficient than the ML 
estimation of standard count data [12]. Hence, there was a trade-off between loss of precision and 
having biased parameter estimates [10]. Since arriving at the choice of most appropriate econometric 
technique is often a difficult process but not often documented in the literature in great detail, in this 
paper we have described criteria that helped us select most appropriate econometric technique.  
We observed evidence for endogeneity (of insurance status) in the number of public OP visits. This 
led us to conclude that the GMM estimator is the best to model the number of public outpatient visits. 
Comparison  of  estimation  results  obtained  from  all  econometric  techniques  explored  in  the  study 
(complete results available upon request) reveals that the parameter estimates for the Askes insurance 
after  controlling  for  endogeneity  were  higher  than  without  controlling  for  it.  This  suggests  that 
estimates of demand given insurance might depend on the empirical econometric specification used in 
the analysis. If the final model is not chosen based on stringent criteria as applied in this case, the 
calculation of premiums and prediction of financial sustainability of an insurance scheme might be 
underestimated. Our  findings  confirm empirical studies  done in  Ecuador and  Ireland. Waters  [10] 
found that after controlling for endogeneity of insurance, the beneficiaries of general health insurance 
programmes  in  Ecuador  significantly  increased  their  demand  for  curative  health  care  by  about  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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30 percent, whilst not controlling for endogeneity of insurance the demand effect was only 11 percent. 
In Ireland, Harmon and Nolan [28] found that treating insurance as exogenous, the probability of 
having a hospital stay was 3  percent higher for those with health insurance. When insurance was 
treated endogenously, the effects approximately double (6 percent).  
In the case of private visits, several statistical tests suggested that the HNB hurdle specification is 
superior to the standard one-part specification. The use of HNB is justified by the fact that health care 
use in this study is measured by number of contacts instead of the total cost of all contacts [7]. Our 
finding is line with previous studies [3], and confirms the importance of distinguishing between factors 
that affect the propensity for contacting health care providers and factors that determine the volume of 
utilization once contact has been made [16]. Bogu [29] also suggests that count data models most 
commonly used are the hurdle model and the finite mixture negative binomial. The validity of hurdle 
specification is suspect if individuals have multiple illness episodes or multiple first contacts or the 
first contact belongs to an illness episode of the preceding illness [3,14,16]. Since utilization data in 
this study is derived from a 4-week recall period, both multiple illness episodes and multiple first 
contacts  seem  unlikely  here.  In  addition,  this  study  included  several  measures  of  current  health 
conditions and an ADL score reflecting long-term health status. As they were not significant in the 
second stage of the HNB model, the HNB retains its superiority over other candidate models. 
The HNB estimates confirm that Askes insurance exhibited a negative relationship in both contact 
and frequency decisions for private OP which is consistent with a priori expectations as the scheme 
entitles beneficiaries to services at public providers only. For Private insurance, the coefficients show 
positive relationships  in both  decision stages  but  are significant  only in the contact  decision. The 
motivation  of  the  hurdle  model  comes  from  „principal-agent‟  theories  of  the  demand  for  health  
care [4]. In this regard, however, our results do not support the possibility of supplier-induced demand 
due to insurance. This might be the result of a strict utilization review program managed by the insurer. 
In addition, our results show that the main determinants of the frequency decision are need-based. This 
is consistent with previous studies that found no evidence of such behavior [3]. 
Another  way  to  look  into  the  evidence  of  supply  induced  demand  (SID)  for  health  care  is  to 
examine how the doctors‟ density affects demand. Physician density in Indonesia is higher in urban 
areas.  Physicians  practicing  in  urban  areas  facing  negative  income  shocks  could  use  their  dual  
role—both as evaluator and supplier—to induce demand [30]. In our models, the urban dummy turned 
out to be positive and significant in both decisions for visits to private OP, suggesting there is evidence 
SID where private provider competition is likely. However, future research is needed to validate our 
finding by including a variable that measures physician density directly.  
The finding that insurance increases individuals‟ propensity for health care utilization is important 
for  policy  makers,  particularly  in  Indonesia  where  current  debate  is  dominated  by  discussions 
regarding improving access to care and the introduction of national health insurance scheme. Although 
such findings have been reported elsewhere [9-11,28], our results are specific to two different types 
insurance (Askes with public providers only and Private with both public and private providers). The 
large effect observed in the use of private providers compared with public ones by Private insurance 
beneficiaries  may  be  explained  in  the  light  of  perceived  quality  of  care.  Theoretically,  insurance 
reduces the effective price that beneficiaries pay for health care [30]. Insured people, given provider 
networks,  choose  the  alternative  that  yields  the  highest  satisfaction  (utility).  As  this  would  mean Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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increasing perceived quality and decreasing prices, the ultimate choice of provider actually reflects the 
relative  trade-off  between  price  and  quality  that  individuals  prefer.  By  offering  private  providers 
(perceived to have better quality), Private insurance reduces the relative price of quality, and hence the 
beneficiaries were more likely to use private providers. If there is a quality effect, our findings would 
imply that public providers may need strategies that would change people‟s perceptions about their 
quality of care. 
Another finding from this analysis bears more discussion. A negative (and statistically significant) 
relationship  to  health  care  demand  of  Private  insurance/income  interaction  in  the  HNB  estimates 
indicates the effects of Private insurance on contact decisions is more pronounced among the poor. 
One possible reason is that the poor have a higher price elasticity of demand, and hence the reduction 
in the effective price of health services due to insurance coverage increases utilization to a greater 
extent among poorer than among richer individuals. From a public health perspective these findings 
are of substantial interest, suggesting current policy on introducing the NHIP will have a stronger 
impact on increasing health care demand among the poor. The introduction of a demand-side subsidy 
to include the 76.4 million poor in the NHIP in Indonesia is supported by the findings of this study.  
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Appendix A. The proposed instruments (zi) and the selected zi.  
 
The proposed instruments zi 
The selected zi in estimating the number of 
outpatient visits to: 
Public providers  Private providers 
If household head government employee (1/0)    √ 
If household head private employee (1/0)  √  √ 
If active in community meetings (1/0)     
If active in cooperative meetings (1/0)    √ 
If active in women group organizations (1/0)    √ 
If housing occupied (1/0)     √ 
If spouse (1/0)  √  √ 
The predicted value of Askes insurance*  √  √ 
The predicted value of Private insurance*  √  √ 
*generated from the prediction of the first-stage regression estimation (Equation 2); marked √ indicates the 
proposed zi was selected in the IV and GMM estimations. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 7                 
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